Clearview AI Inc v Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2025 ABKB 287, considered whether the Information and Privacy Commissioner (the “Commissioner”), can limit a foreign corporation’s ability to collect images from Albertans, using facial recognition software. The Court ultimately sided with the Commissioner but agreed with Clearview AI Inc. (“Clearview”), in part.
Factual Background
Clearview is a US company offering facial recognition software and a database to its customers. It uses billions of images taken from the internet, including from Albertans’ social media accounts to compile its database. The images collected in their software are marketed to law enforcement agencies. This process is known as image scraping.
In 2021, Clearview’s practice of scraping the internet was jointly investigated by the privacy commissioners in Alberta, Quebec, and British Columbia. The report found that Clearview’s activities breached privacy statutes in each jurisdiction, ordering that Clearview:
- Cease offering all facial recognition services to clients in Alberta;
- Cease the collection, use, and disclosure off images and biometric facial arrays collected from individuals in Alberta; and
- Delete images and biometric facial arrays that have been collected from individuals in Alberta and that are in their possession.
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Decision
Clearview judicially reviewed this decision, arguing that its activities were outside of the jurisdiction of the Personal Information Protection Act (“PIPA”). It further argued that the Commissioner’s interpretation of PIPA and PIPA Regulation was contrary to the Charter, violating section 2(b)’s freedom of expression guarantee.
The Commissioner submitted that Clearview is subject to PIPA because it offers its services to clients in Alberta, and because it scraped images from Albertans. The Commissioner also argued that Clearview failed to establish a reasonable purpose for collecting, using, and disclosing Albertans’ personal information, which is necessary under sections 11, 16, and 19 of PIPA.
The Court ultimately upheld the Commissioners order as Clearview’s facial-recognition services lacked a “reasonable purpose” for its scraping practice, particularly due to its mass surveillance and privacy risks. However, they agreed that Clearview’s location in the US did not negate Charter protection, as it involved expressive conduct in Canada. Further, they agreed that PIPA provisions and PIPA Regulations prohibited Clearview’s expressive activity under section 2(b) of the Charter, as it made it impractical to secure consent from every person whose data or images appeared online. As such, the Court found that section 7(e) of the PIPA Regulations was overly broad, and struck down the words “including, but not limited to, magazines, books, and newspapers.” The Court clarified that “publication” in its ordinary sense included any information that was intentionally made public, such as social media posts or websites, and that this information can be used without consent.
This foundational decision indicates a clear direction the Courts have taken regarding privacy and information law in the context of modern technology. For a more thorough analysis of the court’s reasoning, read the complete decision here.
